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Targeting Foreclosure Interventions: An Analysis of Neighborhood Characteristics Associated with 
High Foreclosure Rates in Two Minnesota Counties 
 
By Michael Grover, Laura Smith, and Richard M. Todd 
 
Abstract:  This study examines the statistical association of foreclosure sales with social, 
economic and housing variables measured at the census tract level for two purposes of interest to 
foreclosure mitigation practitioners—to assess whether it is feasible to identify in advance 
neighborhoods likely to have high rates of foreclosure, and to explore the socioeconomic traits of 
high-foreclosure neighborhoods so as to design appropriate mitigation programs. We collected 
data on foreclosure sales in 2002 from the sheriff’s departments of Hennepin and Ramsey 
counties, the two core counties that comprise the Minneapolis-St. Paul MSA.  We find that 
several factors commonly associated with high foreclosure sale rates could have correctly 
identified, in advance, most neighborhoods with high rates of mortgage foreclosure.  To guide the 
design of foreclosure mitigation programs, we also present evidence that foreclosure risks in our 
two counties were highest in neighborhoods with elevated credit risk indicators and a high 
proportion of homeowners who are recent minority buyers or young.   We show that an accurate 
credit risk variable is among the best predictors of foreclosure and also critically affects our 
multivariate analysis of factors associated with foreclosure.  To limit social losses associated with 
foreclosures, we conclude that consideration should be given to enhancing public access to data 
on mortgages, foreclosures, and foreclosure risk factors, especially the neighborhood distribution 
of credit scores.   
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Public policy promotes homeownership generally and recently has also sought to close racial and ethnic 
homeownership gaps.  Many such policies focus on barriers to becoming a homeowner, but research 
shows that the ability to sustain homeownership is also a policy concern.  It has been shown that disparate 
rates of exit from homeownership account for a significant share of racial homeownership gaps and that 
exits via foreclosure involve externalities that could lead to an inefficient allocation of resources.
 1 
 
In a number of cities, campaigns backed by public and private resources have been mounted to mitigate 
the personal and public impact of foreclosures generally, and spatially concentrated foreclosures in 
                                                           
1 See Haurin and Rosenthal (2004), Reid (2004) and Apgar, Duda and Nawrocki Gorey (2005). 
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particular.  Although many of these efforts seem to be achieving good results already
2, our working 
assumption is that analysis of foreclosure data can enhance their effectiveness and efficiency in two ways.  
First, by predicting the neighborhoods where future foreclosure rates will be high, analysis can help 
practitioners target their resources to the neediest neighborhoods.  Second, by providing reliable 
information on the characteristics of neighborhoods and borrowers that are most closely associated with 
high foreclosure risks, analysis can help practitioners shape the content of their interventions to more 
effectively address the needs of borrowers in foreclosure. 
 
Our analysis illustrates that useful information can be easily generated if the necessary data on 
foreclosures and key related factors are readily available.  Using data from Hennepin and Ramsey 
counties,
3 the core of the Twin Cities metropolitan area, we show that indicators of low income, minority 
population, or credit risk could have been used to identify neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates in 
advance, thereby allowing foreclosure counselors and others to focus their prevention and mitigation 
efforts on these areas.
4   
 
Although numerous studies have discussed factors correlated with foreclosure, we believe we are the first 
to explicitly analyze how accurately high foreclosure neighborhoods can be identified in advance.  We are 
also one of the few studies of neighborhood foreclosure patterns that measures neighborhood credit risk 
levels with data based on actual credit scores.  This variable is not only our best single predictor of future 
foreclosure rates but is also critical to our multivariate analysis of the neighborhood traits associated with 
foreclosures.  For our study area, a high percentage of adults with very low credit scores and an upward 
trend in the percentage of minority homeowners were the two factors most strongly and robustly 
associated with high foreclosure rates in 2002.  When we substitute a well-known but less accurate credit 
                                                           
2 See Apgar and Duda (2005b); Collins and Nawrocki Gorey (2004); Baker (2004); Quercia, Cowan, and Moreno (2004); Home 
Ownership Center (2004); and Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago (2005). 
3 Hennepin and Ramsey counties include the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul respectively; both contain numerous suburbs. 
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risk proxy based on mortgage denial rates, our analysis of related factors is qualitatively different.  An 
association between foreclosures and the minority share of the general or home-owning population also 
becomes significant, apparently because the proxy systematically underestimates credit risks in 
neighborhoods with high minority populations.  The proxy’s tendency to focus attention directly on 
minority presence, rather than on the credit history issues that seem to underlie the minority share and 
foreclosure correlation, could mislead mitigation program design. 
 
We also discuss how our multivariate results square with the literature on foreclosures and neighborhood 
transition, arguing that existing interpretations derived from experience in cities with falling housing 
prices may not provide a good explanation for foreclosures in Minneapolis and St. Paul.  As an 
alternative, we suggest a simpler interpretation relating foreclosures to increased home buying by 
households who may have been economically vulnerable or financially inexperienced.  
 
Our results suggest that there may be social benefits to making some of the data we use more routinely 
available to the public.  Public foreclosure and mortgage records, which are now often unavailable to the 
public in electronic formats that facilitate analysis, can help identify existing foreclosure hotspots and 
vulnerable populations for targeted interventions.  They can also help identify the types of loans and the 
individual lenders most commonly involved in foreclosures.  Although further analysis of the costs and 
privacy issues associated with greater availability is needed, we conclude that there is at least a potential 
public interest in making these data more readily available to foreclosure mitigation efforts, and we make 
some specific suggestions as to the kinds of changes that should be considered.  In addition, our most 
effective predictor and the key variable in our analysis of related factors—the prevalence of low credit 
scores in each neighborhood—is normally not available to public and nonprofit foreclosure mitigation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 A complication to our analysis is that some well-regarded foreclosure counseling organizations were operating in our study area 
during our study period.  So our data on foreclosures should be thought of as foreclosure sales rates net of foreclosure sales 
prevented by existing foreclosure counseling efforts. 
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efforts.  We suggest that consideration also be given to how that data might be made more available to 
foreclosure mitigation practitioners. 
 
II.  Factors Affecting Mortgage Foreclosures 
 
In the 1990s, researchers developed models of the factors associated with foreclosures, in order to more 
accurately price mortgage-backed securities.  The research has focused on two distinct causes.
5  
According to the options theory of foreclosures, foreclosures occur when the value of the property falls 
sufficiently below the outstanding loan balance, so that the borrower finds it profitable to exercise the 
option to put the collateral to the lender in lieu of continuing a stream of payments whose present value 
exceeds the value of the property.  In empirical work, these so-called ruthless foreclosures are often 
associated with homes whose market value has stagnated or declined and with loans with a high initial 
loan-to-value ratio.  According to the trigger event theory, foreclosures occur when the borrower 
experiences financial setbacks, such as job loss, divorce, or medical expenses, that make it difficult to 
continue making payments.  In empirical work, these foreclosures are often associated with low credit 
scores or high unemployment rates.  The two types of causes can merge, as when a borrower with limited 
equity loses a job, misses payments, and incurs penalties that push the amount owed above the value of 
the home.  We draw on both theories below. 
 
III.  Data 
 
The data for this study come from several sources.  Researchers from the University of Minnesota and 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis jointly collected public data on 1,199 foreclosure sales for 
Hennepin and Ramsey counties in 2002.
6  The foreclosure sale documents contained information about 
                                                           
5 Ambrose and Capone (1998). 
6 Our team collected and entered the 2002 foreclosure sale data for Ramsey County.  We thank Jeff Crump and his associates at 
the University of Minnesota for collecting and entering the data for Hennepin County. 
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the property, original mortgage, mortgagor and mortgagee names, mortgage assignments, and the sheriff’s 
sale.  In total, we obtained usable data on 1,178 residential properties from the sheriff’s sale documents.
 7   
 
Collecting the 2002 data through public sources proved problematic from the start.  Neither county had 
the sales records available in electronic format, so all 1,199 records were obtained as hard copies.  Since 
the foreclosure sale documents only listed legal descriptions, we needed to match the legal descriptions of 
all foreclosed properties to unique street addresses. After this step, the 1,178 usable street addresses were 
geocoded and matched to a census tract. All of the other information on the sale document had to be 
manually entered into the database before it could also be analyzed.  Overall, this process took several 
months to complete.  
 
The address of the foreclosed property was the most important piece of information for this research, but 
not the only one considered.  The researchers also sought to identify other patterns in the foreclosures, 
such as the lenders involved, interest rates, mortgage riders or conditions, and the dates of the mortgage 
originations.  Additional time-consuming data collection at the property-records departments of both 
counties was required in order to complete, revise or add to the foreclosure sales records. 
 
Two pieces of data proved especially laborious to confirm.  First, it was nearly impossible to distinguish 
refinance from home purchase loans, even after reviewing mortgage documents filed at the counties’ 
property-records offices.  Second, for some documents it was difficult to determine the lender of record. 
For example, a small portion (roughly 5 percent in 2002) of the sale documents listed the Mortgage 
Electronic Registry System (MERS) as the lender.
8   While additional reviews of county property records 
                                                           
7 The total number of residential foreclosure sales recorded by both counties was actually 1,199 in 2002.  Data on 21 of the 
foreclosure sales, however, were excluded because each of these sales could not be accurately matched to a street address. 
8 MERS-related loan volume increased substantially in just three years, accounting for over one-third of the foreclosure sales in 
Hennepin County alone in 2005.  A Virginia-based company, MERS acts as nominee in the county land records for the lender 
and the loan servicer and eliminates the need for these two entities to file assignments when trading loans.  This service can make 
the process of trading mortgages on the secondary market more efficient.  MERS can appear as either the record mortgage holder 
(commencing the foreclosure) or the purchaser of the foreclosed property, or both.  MERS is not the only entity that obscures 
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did allow for the resolution of most unconfirmed lending transactions in 2002, unless this step is taken it 
is not possible to know who the lender was.  The additional steps we took to collect and refine the 
foreclosure sale information limited the amount of data that we could reasonably obtain and forced us to 
focus on a single year and the two core counties.   
 
After this initial phase, we made several additional steps to improve the quality of the data.  These efforts 
resulted in the creation of three datasets used in our analysis.  Two datasets use individual property 
records as the unit of analysis.  The first one refines and enhances the 1,178 individual foreclosure sale 
records.  In order to standardize the list of mortgagees, we used information from the Federal Reserve 
System’s National Information Center (NIC) to place all foreclosed mortgages under a current lender.  
We used the NIC database to identify and categorize lending institutions as either a bank, bank affiliate or 
other lending institution.  We also identified lenders as being either prime or subprime using the 2002 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s list of Subprime and Manufactured Lenders.
9   
 
We took several steps to augment the data contained on the sheriff’s sale document.  We used public 
property records databases in both counties to collect data on the interest rate and mortgage riders for the 
mortgages under foreclosure.  Of the 1,178 sets of documents reviewed, 62 percent contained interest rate 
and mortgage rider information.  To see if foreclosed mortgages tend to have above-average interest rates, 
we matched the original interest rate on each foreclosed mortgage to the average monthly rate on 30-year 
conventional mortgages originated in the same month as the foreclosed mortgage, using data posted by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
information about a lender.  Other financial entities, such as banks, often act as trustees in property transactions.  See Apgar and 
Duda (2005a), 26–27. 
9 See the following HUD Web site for more information on how subprime lenders were identified, 
www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html.   
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We created a second dataset of properties that were not under foreclosure sale in 2002.  We took this 
additional step in order to compare pricing and mortgagee information for these properties with those that 
were under foreclosure.  To do this, we selected a residential area north of downtown Minneapolis, which 
exhibited a high rate of foreclosure sales in 2002, and selected a 20 percent random sample (198 
properties identified from a county parcel data set) from a list of total properties sold in the area between 
1998 and 2002.  This five-year time period roughly corresponds to the origination dates for most 
foreclosed mortgages in the area.  Using a public property-records database at Hennepin County, we 
gathered information on these other mortgages, including the mortgagee, interest rate, and rider 
information.   We also matched the interest rate on each of these mortgages to the average rate on 30-year 
conventional mortgages originated in the same month.  We use these two datasets to provide an overview 
of foreclosure sale patterns in both counties.   
 
Finally, we organized a third dataset of economic and demographic information for the census tracts of 
Hennepin and Ramsey counties.  We merged some census tracts to facilitate analysis, specifically to 
allow for the linking of census data from 1990 and 2000 due to tract boundary changes and due to the fact 
that some tracts had too few mortgaged properties to allow computation of a meaningful foreclosure sale 
rate.
10  We base most of our analysis of the neighborhood factors associated with foreclosures on 327 
“merged tracts” for which we have complete data.  With the exception of two essentially nonresidential 
tracts that were omitted, our 327 merged tracts cover all of Hennepin and Ramsey counties.  From this 
point on, we will use the terms “tract” and “merged tract” synonymously, unless otherwise noted.  As is 
conventional, these tracts are what we mean by a “neighborhood.”  The location information available for 
each foreclosure sale permits mapping the precise location of each foreclosure as well as assigning each 
one to a distinct tract. 
 
                                                           
10 In all cases, tracts with low counts of mortgaged properties were merged with adjacent tracts. 
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A key variable from Census 2000 is each tract’s number of owner-occupied housing units with a 
mortgage outstanding.  Following Apgar and Duda (2004) and others, we use this variable as the 
denominator in calculating the 2002 foreclosure sale rate for each tract.  The approximate two-year gap 
between our measure of mortgaged units and our measure of foreclosure sales, although imperfect, nearly 
aligns with the median time between mortgage origination and foreclosure in our sample.  In that sense, 
we regard the Census 2000 data on mortgaged units to be an acceptable denominator for computing an 
annual foreclosure sale rate.   
 
We augmented the census data with data on credit scores and mortgage market activity.  From mortgage 
data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), we selected home purchase 
origination and denial rates from 1996–1999.  We also used 1999 credit worthiness data obtained by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis through the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
from PCI Corporation.  Using the PCI data for each tract on the total number of adults and the number of 
adults whose credit score in 1999 was in the “very high risk” category (i.e., who had very low credit 
scores), we created a variable for the percentage of adults in each tract who had a very risky credit score 
in 1999.
11  Before using our data to see how well foreclosure hotspots could have been predicted, we 
provide a general overview of Hennepin and Ramsey County foreclosure sales and foreclosure sale rate 
patterns. 
 
IV.  Overview of Hennepin and Ramsey County Foreclosure Sales 
 
National foreclosure rates began to rise in the late 1990s and hit new peak levels (at least by modern 
standards) in the early 2000s before declining again.
12  Rising foreclosure rates coincided with the rapid 
                                                           
11 Credit risk categories ranged from very low to very high credit risk and also included the number of adults in the population 
with no credit information.  In our analysis, we experimented with additional categories such as “high risk” and “no credit score” 
but found that they added little.  Credit risk variables for merged tracts were computed using population-based credit risk data 
obtained from PCI Corporation and CRA Whiz through a contract with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.     
12 These conclusions are based on quarterly data from the Mortgage Bankers Association of America on the percentage of 
outstanding mortgages for which the legal process of foreclosure has been initiated but not yet completed. 
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expansion of subprime lending and widespread allegations of “predatory” lending, often in the same 
neighborhoods that were experiencing high rates of foreclosure.  This combination focused attention on 
the public policy issues raised by foreclosures, especially in cities where foreclosures tended to 
concentrate their public and private burdens in poor neighborhoods.  As a result, numerous studies of 
metropolitan real estate markets have documented some of the borrower, lender, and neighborhood 
factors that correlate with high rates of foreclosure.
13  Since average housing prices were rising in most 
cities during the late 1990s and early 2000s, most of these factors relate to the trigger event theory of 
foreclosures, not options theory.  Our data generally support previous research findings. 
 
When standardized by the number of mortgaged units in a neighborhood, the foreclosure sale rate was 
similar in our two counties in 2002.  See Table 1.  [Tables begin on page 36 of this report; Figures are 
listed immediately after the Tables section.]  However, the central cities of Minneapolis (Hennepin) and 
St. Paul (Ramsey) have much higher foreclosure sale rates than the suburban municipalities around them, 
as also shown in Figure 1.  This figure displays Hennepin (to the west) and Ramsey counties, their major 
bodies of water and highways, and the boundaries of the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul.  Each dot in 
the figure represents the location of one of the 1,178 residential foreclosure sales from 2002 that we 
analyze.  Foreclosures occurred throughout the two-county area but varied considerably in density, with 
the highest density areas to the northwest and southeast of downtown Minneapolis and in a belt around 
downtown St. Paul.  Converting to neighborhood foreclosure sale rates—2002 foreclosures per 100 
owner-occupied, mortgaged units in Census 2000—largely preserves this spatial pattern of concentration.  
See Figure 2.  
 
As in other studies, our foreclosed mortgages are disproportionately of recent origin and carry higher rates 
of interest.  In our 2002 data, the median duration before a foreclosure sale in Hennepin and Ramsey 
                                                           
13 See Apgar and Duda (2004), Apgar and Duda (2005a), Garcia (2003), Gruenstein and Herbert (2000), Immergluck and Smith 
(2004), Lauria and Baxter (2000), Newburger (2006), and The Reinvestment Fund (2005). 
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counties was 2.6 years.   Also, as shown in Figure 3, most (86 percent) of the foreclosure sales with 
interest rate information had a rate above the simultaneous prevailing rate on 30-year fixed-rate prime 
mortgages.  Most of the foreclosure sales with adjustable-rate mortgages had an interest rate significantly 
higher than the simultaneous prevailing rate; by contrast, the majority of foreclosure sales with fixed-rate 
mortgages had an interest rate within one percentage point of the prevailing rate.  In short, most Hennepin 
and Ramsey County foreclosure sales in 2002 occurred within three years of origination of the mortgage 
and about half involved loans with high rates of interest.  Figures 4 and 5 further illustrate these patterns. 
 
Given the high interest rates on many foreclosed mortgages, and the prevalence of nonbank subprime 
lenders in the high-risk mortgage market, it is not surprising that most of the mortgages foreclosed in 
2002 were originated by lenders other than federally regulated banks or their affiliates.  See Figure 6.  
Examining individual lenders reveals that the largest share of foreclosed sales (135 out of 1,178, or 13 
percent) had mortgages originated by Ameriquest or two of its affiliates (Long Beach Mortgage Company 
and Town and Country Credit).  This is significant because allegations of serious lending abuses in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s have been made regarding Ameriquest offices in the Twin Cities.
14  It is 
possible, therefore, that a sizable portion of the 2002 foreclosure sales in our data may reflect what many 
would deem abusive or predatory lending.  
 
The high interest rates and other high-risk attributes typical of mortgages foreclosed in 2002 are not 
necessarily typical of all mortgages in their neighborhood, even in neighborhoods with relatively low 
incomes and high foreclosure sale rates.  For a high-foreclosure area north of downtown Minneapolis, 
Table 2 shows some statistically significant differences between our foreclosed mortgages and a random 
sample of other mortgages originated in the same area between 1998 and 2002, when the majority of the 
area’s foreclosed mortgages were originated.  Compared to typical mortgages in their neighborhood, the 
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foreclosed mortgages were smaller, had higher interest rates, and were more likely to have been 
originated by a nonbank or subprime lender.  Foreclosed properties in this area were also more likely to 
have another mortgage on the property as well. 
 
Overall, we found that 80 percent of borrowers in foreclosure owed more on their mortgages than the 
original principal amount.  The median difference between the principal and the amount outstanding at 
the time of the foreclosure sale was about $4,500, and likely due to missed payments, fees, and unpaid 
taxes.  Still, in 9 out of 10 foreclosure sales, the sheriff sale amount was more than the amount 
outstanding on the mortgage, with a median difference of approximately $3,400.  The fact that most 
foreclosed properties were sold for more than the outstanding amount due on the mortgage is likely a 
reflection of the strong and appreciating housing market in the region that began in the mid-1990s.  This 
finding suggests that many borrowers in foreclosure in the Twin Cities in 2002 might have paid their 
outstanding debt and departed with some equity.  This finding further supports the view that timely, well-
targeted mitigation efforts can reduce the overall costs of foreclosures to borrowers, lenders, and the 
general public.   
 
Switching our perspective from the individual loans to the Hennepin and Ramsey county neighborhoods 
that had high foreclosure sale rates in 2002, we find that they display many of the characteristics that 
earlier studies have associated with elevated foreclosure sale rates, as shown in Table 3.  Consistent with 
the trigger event theory, foreclosure sale rates in our 327 merged tracts have strong (over 0.65) positive 
correlations with three indicators of credit risk and three indicators of high or increasing minority 
presence.  Figure 7 further illustrates the tendency for foreclosure sale rates to rise with the minority share 
of a neighborhood’s population.  Other credit risk and minority variables, as well as the neighborhood’s 
rate of unemployment, are fairly strongly positively correlated with foreclosure sale rates as well.  A high 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 See Ameriquest Press Release, “Ameriquest Announces Agreement with States,” and Los Angeles Times, “Workers Say 
Lender Ran ‘Boiler Rooms’.” 
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share of young homeowners, who often have less wealth and less stable employment than older 
borrowers, is somewhat positively correlated.  By contrast, levels of education and income correlate 
negatively with foreclosure sale rates to a moderate or strong degree.  Figure 8 shows that both high-
income and some low-income neighborhoods have low foreclosure sale rates, while high foreclosure sale 
rates are concentrated in other low-income neighborhoods.  The positive correlation between FHA 
lending and foreclosure sale rates provides some support for the options theory of foreclosures too, since 
FHA loans can indicate a tendency toward higher loan-to-value ratios. 
 
V.  An Assessment of Variables That Can Predict Foreclosure “Hotspots” 
 
Having described some of the factors associated with high foreclosure sale rates in our study area, we 
now assess how well individual variables, that would have been known in advance and that foreclosure 
theory and studies say are correlated with foreclosure rates, would have performed as predictors of high 
foreclosure risk neighborhoods in 2002.  We find that most of the variables we tried would have correctly 
identified in advance about two-thirds of the top quintile of foreclosure rate neighborhoods in 2002.  
Overall, our 1999 neighborhood credit score variable is the most accurate in identifying high foreclosure-
sale rate tracts, but other variables available before 2002, like average 1990 household income or the 1990 
nonwhite population share, also do well.  We present maps further illustrating how several variables could 
have been used to direct foreclosure mitigation resources to most Twin Cities areas of highest need in 
2002, but the credit score variable seems at least marginally superior, due to a lower tendency to falsely 
identify neighborhoods as high-risk. 
 
Table 4 shows how seven variables available before 2002 compare in their ability to correctly rank tracts 
according to their foreclosure sale rates in 2002.  None of the variables correctly ranks even half of the 20 
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highest foreclosure-sale rate tracts in its top 20
15, but the percent of tracts correctly identified improves 
when the comparison expands to the top 50 and top 65 (first quintile) foreclosure-sale rate tracts.  The 
ranking based on credit score correctly identifies 72 percent of the top 50 foreclosure-sale rate tracts, and 
rankings based on the percent of the population living in poverty in 1990, (the negative of) average 1990 
household income, and a high incidence of subprime refinance mortgages originations in 1999 were 
nearly as good, identifying 70 percent of the top 50 foreclosure-sale rate tracts.  The credit score variable 
has a run of success as the number of tracts ranked expands to the top quintile of foreclosure-sale rate 
tracts, at which point it correctly identifies 77 percent, compared to 55 to 68 percent for all of the other 
variables in Table 4.  Expanding the rankings further, to the top 100 foreclosure-sale rate tracts, narrows 
most of these differences, with the credit score correctly identifying 72 percent compared to 71 percent 
for the mortgage denial variable and 65 to 69 percent for most of the rest (except that the percent of 
nonwhite homeowners in 1990 gets only 52 percent correct). 
 
The figures on the number of top foreclosure-sales rate tracts correctly identified were chosen in part 
because they focus where we think practitioners would want to focus—only on the top end of the 
distribution of foreclosure incidence.  To assess the ability of our variables to rank the entire distribution 
of foreclosure rates, Table 5 shows Spearman rank correlation coefficients between each variable’s 
ranking of all 327 tracts and the actual ordering of foreclosure rates for all tracts. Again, the 1999 credit 
score variable performs best, with a correlation of 0.640.  Its closest competitors are the 1996-99 
mortgage denial rate, the incidence of subprime refinancing, and (the negative of) average 1990 
household income, whose correlations are lower by 7 or 8 hundredths.  The other 1990 Census variables 
have correlations that are also lower than the 1999 credit score variable. 
 
                                                           
15 We discovered, accidentally, that a tract’s 1990 public assistance income per capita ranks 11 of the top 20 foreclosure sales rate 
tracts in its top 20, but we have not focused on this result because per capita public assistance income is not a variable typically 
considered in analyses of foreclosure incidence and hence would probably not have been considered, in real time, for predicting 
areas of high foreclosure rates in 2002.  However, it also performed well at identifying tracts in the top 50 (35 correct), top 65 (44 
correct), and top 100 (68 correct), so it may be useful to evaluate its predictive potential with other data sets. 
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Although the credit score consistently leads the pack, its edge is often slim and only sometimes 
significant by conventional standards, especially when we focus just on identifying the top 100 or fewer 
foreclosure-sale rate tracts.  We compute statistical significance with a series of pairwise modified 
permutation tests, each based on the null hypothesis that rankings based on the credit score variable and 
one of the other variables are equivalent with respect to predicting or correlating with the ranking of 
foreclosure-sale rate tracts.  (In all cases, rankings are listed in an unchanging order, from the ranking of 
Tract #1 in row #1 to the ranking of Tract #327 in row 327.)  For example, consider the null that rankings 
based on the credit score variable and the percent poor variable are equivalent.  If so, then randomly 
swapping subsets of data between the two variables should not lead to a systematic difference in their 
performance.  To exploit that idea, we randomly select 1,000 327x1 vectors of ones and zeros.  For each 
of these vectors, we then identify all the rows with ones and ignore those with zeros.  For the rows that 
have a one, we exchange the rank in the credit score variable with the corresponding rank from the other 
variable, and then recompute the rankings for each modified variable.  We also compute our statistics of 
interest for each of the 1,000 pairs of randomly modified variables as well as the difference between the 
credit score variable’s statistics and the other variable’s statistics.  The result is a nonparametric estimate, 
which imposes the null hypothesis of equivalence but no other assumptions, of the distribution of the 
difference in the statistics. 
 
We use this estimated distribution to judge whether the actual difference between our credit score 
variable’s statistics and the other variables’ statistics is consistent with the null hypothesis of no 
difference.  For the Spearman rank correlations, which puts equal weight on all portions of the entire 
ranking of the 327 tracts, the fourth column of Table 5 shows that we consistently reject the null that the 
other variables are equivalent to the credit score variable.  When we focus only on the top 100 or fewer 
foreclosure-sale rate tracts, the results are much less decisive and depend on exactly how many top tracts 
we include.  Among the top 20 foreclosure-sale rate tracts, the credit score variable is clearly only on par 
with the three other variables that also correctly identify 9 of the 20.  For the top 50 tracts, the credit score 
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variable has a numeric edge, but the only variable with a statistically significant performance lag, judging 
by the p-values in parentheses in Table 4, is the percentage of nonwhite homeowners in 1990.  With the 
credit score variable performing especially well as the focus expands to the top 65 tracts, its advantage 
over all the other variables becomes significant at that point, using a 10 percent significance level and 
making no allowance for the fact that multiple tests are being conducted.  However, it gives back some of 
the significance of its edge if we further expand to the top 100 foreclosure-sale rate tracts.  At that point, 
the p-values are 0.037 for percent poor in 1990, 0.034 for percent nonwhite in 1990, 0.000 for the percent 
of nonwhite homeowners in 1990, 0.122 for (the negative of) average 1990 household income, 0.165 for 
subprime mortgage refinancing incidence, and 0.469 for mortgage denial rates.
16,17  
 
Additional insights into how these variables might have guided resource allocation can be gained from the 
maps in Figures 9 to 15. The map corresponding to each variable codes each tract as a Hit (correctly 
identified as in the top quintile of foreclosure sale rates in 2002, shown in red), a Miss (incorrectly 
identified as out of the top quintile when actually in the top quintile, shown in yellow), a False Positive 
(identified as in the top quintile when actually out of that quintile, shown in blue), or as Other (correctly 
identified as not in the top quintile, shown as white).  Figure 9, for example, shows the Hits, Misses, and 
False Positives based on ranking tracts by the percentage of adults with a very risky credit score.  The red 
areas corresponding to Hits cluster in four high foreclosure sale rate areas–central St. Paul, south-central 
                                                           
16 We tried other variables and simple combinations of variables with similar results, and we suspect that additional variables, 
like the percent of the population with a high school degree, might also work well.  In recognition of Apgar and Duda’s (2004, 
2005) analysis of foreclosure patterns based on a combination of income and race, we also created a variable that flagged a tract 
as high risk if the tract was in the riskiest quintile for both 1990 household income and 1990 minority population share.  The 
performance of this indicator for the top 50 or 65 was in line with the other good performers shown in Table 4.   
17 Because data from Census 2000 would not have been available to guide resource allocation in 2002, the results presented use 
Census variables from just the 1990 census.  This gives an advantage to variables that are more frequently updated like the credit 
score or the HMDA-derived variables, whose values through 1999 are used above.  To assess whether more up-to-date estimates 
of the Census variables would have been useful, we also evaluated Census 2000 versions of all the Census variables.  The results 
were similar to the 1990-based results presented, except that the performance of the percentage of nonwhite homeowners variable 
improved markedly. Had it been available in advance, it would have correctly identified 11 of the top 20 tracts, 36 of the top 50, 
and 47 of the top 65.  Its Spearman rank correlation is .044 lower than that of the credit score variable, but this difference is not 
significant (p=.125).  The fact that the percent of nonwhite homeowners changes from a weak competitor to the credit score 
variable using 1990 data to a strong competitor using 2000 data is related to one of the findings of the next section’s multivariate 
analysis – that change in the percentage of nonwhite homeowners is significantly correlated to foreclosure rates even after 
controlling for the neighborhood distribution of credit scores.  However, it is not clear that this relationship could have been 
exploited in real time to better anticipate foreclosure rates in 2002. 
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Minneapolis, northwest (known as “North”) Minneapolis, and a suburban area just north of Minneapolis.  
The credit score variable would have successfully guided resources to these four high-foreclosure 
hotspots.  Its Misses, in yellow, are often adjacent to the red areas correctly identified, so in practice 
resources allocated to the red areas also would have been easily accessed by residents in many of the 
missed tracts as well.  Similarly, most of its False Positives, in blue, were near to actual high risk tracts, 
so directing resources there would not have been especially expensive (on the margin) or wasteful.  
However, this variable’s failure to identify high foreclosure risks in suburban areas along Minneapolis’s 
western border might be problematic, to the extent that foreclosure mitigation resources sometimes do not 
cross such political boundaries easily.  Its remaining Misses are widely scattered and include some high-
income neighborhoods; it is unclear whether public and nonprofit foreclosure mitigation resources could 
or would have been especially targeted there even if these areas had been identified in advance.  
 
Figure 15 shows that using the rate of prime mortgage denials to guide resource allocation would have 
given fairly similar results.  However, this variable has more Misses and its False Positives are more 
extensive and not as near to actual high foreclosure-sale rate tracts.  So using this variable to allocate 
resources could have led to increases in cost and potential waste.  Figures 10 to 14 map the results for the 
other variables in Table 4 and show large areas of False Positives in central and south Minneapolis, and 
sometimes in suburban areas too.  Compared to Figure 9, they also show more Misses, especially in the 
northwest portion of Minneapolis and its near northern suburbs.   
 
Overall, we think that the credit risk variable would have led to the most effective and efficient allocation 
of foreclosure mitigation resources in Hennepin and Ramsey counties in 2002.  It correctly picks out the 
major areas where high foreclosure-sale rate tracts cluster, and its Misses and False Positives are mostly 
near the same areas.  It has the lowest rate of False Positives for the top quintile of foreclosure risk and 
would have led to only limited waste.  Because it is designed to identify households whose debt 
repayment ability is weak, we also have some faith that its success was not just accidental and might 
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generalize to other years or places.  It has the potential advantage that it is kept up-to-date continuously, 
unlike Census and other official data.
18,19  We are less confident that the reasonably good performance of 
some of the other variables in 2002 in our study area would hold up over time and space, as conditions in 
society and the mortgage business change.  For now, however, the Twin Cities’ experience in 2002 
suggests that variables like prime mortgage denial rate, household income, minority population share, and 
the prevalence of subprime refinancing may be effective supplements to or substitutes for credit risk 
information, which is often not readily available to nonprofit foreclosure mitigation organizations.  Of 
course, additional research is needed to assess whether these findings generalize to other times and places.  
 
VI.  A Multivariate Analysis of Factors Associated with High Rates of Foreclosure Sales 
 
In this section, we are no longer analyzing forecasts but instead conduct a multivariate after-the-fact 
analysis of factors associated with high foreclosure sale rates.  The hope is that understanding those 
factors, even after the fact, can help improve the design of future foreclosure prevention programs. 
 
A.  Overview.  The many neighborhood factors that correlate with high foreclosure sale rates are generally 
moderately to strongly correlated with each other as well.  Pairs of variables from Table 3, for example, 
mostly exhibit correlations of .50 or higher, and correlations of .70 or higher are also present.  The general 
pattern of multicollinearity among the factors commonly associated with foreclosures makes it difficult to 
understand the nature of the relationships between these factors and foreclosures.  Although we think a 
full, causal understanding of these relationships cannot be extracted from our cross-sectional data, for the 
purpose of guiding the design of foreclosure mitigation programs we would like to shed some light on the 
relative independence or redundancy of the information conveyed about foreclosure sales rates by the 
                                                           
18 We also mapped many of the same Census variables using Census 2000 data, even though it would not have been available to 
practitioners before 2002, to assess whether more up-to-date values would improve the somewhat inferior performance of the 
Census variables. The credit risk variable remained superior, in our judgment, even when compared to Census 2000 data for 
income and minority shares, using the same criteria as above. 
19 Of course, fully exploiting its advantages would require making neighborhood credit score data more readily available to 
government agencies and nonprofit organizations engaged in foreclosure mitigation. We discuss this later in the paper.  
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various factors.  We find that high 2002 foreclosure sales rates in our study area seem most clearly 
associated with two dimensions of our neighborhood data—credit risk and rising minority 
homeownership.  This type of finding may be of use in developing effective intervention strategies now 
and could grow in importance as a resource-targeting tool as additional years of foreclosure and related 
data accumulate.  We also comment on whether these results validate existing causal models of 
foreclosure sale rates.  
 
B.  Methodology.  The basic variable of interest is the 2002 foreclosure sale rate, fri, defined for each 
merged tract as the number of foreclosure sales in the tract in 2002 divided by the number of owner-
occupied, mortgaged units reported in the tract in Census 2000.  A foreclosure sale in a given year is an 
unlikely event—the highest rate among tracts in our 2002 sample was under 5 foreclosure sales per 100 
mortgaged units.  For that reason, a large population of mortgaged units is needed to accurately measure a 
neighborhood’s probability of foreclosure.  However, many of our tracts, even after merging those with 
the lowest numbers, had only 100 to 300 mortgaged units.  Others had far more.  It is thus likely that our 
foreclosure sale rate variable measures underlying foreclosure probabilities with error, and that the 
variance of that error varies systematically between tracts with high and low numbers of mortgaged units.  
This is a common problem for analysts of rate or proportions data. 
 
To adjust for the resulting heteroscedasticity of the error term in our regression results, we use the logit 
version of the minimum Chi-squared estimator (MCSE) for proportions data that is described in Greene 
(2003).
20  To avoid taking logarithms of zero in tracts that had no foreclosures, we define the dependent 
variable in our MCSE regressions as lfri =  log[( fri*+eps)/(1-fri* +eps)], where eps is a small number.
21  
For comparison, and because weighted regression statistics cannot be used to compare the fit of 
                                                           
20 See Greene (2003), Chapter 21, pages 686–689.   
21  In the results we present, the small number is one-half of the smallest positive value for fri, or about .00019.  We experimented 
with values that ranged between twice as large and five times as small, with no important qualitative change in our conclusions.  
Of course, the specific values of coefficients and goodness of fit statistics do vary with the choice of the replacement for zero 
values.  All of our regressions were implemented by code we wrote for Estima’s RATS for Windows 6.10 software package. 
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alternative specifications, we present the ordinary least-squares (OLS) results for lfri produced in the first 
stage of the MCSE procedure.   
 
C.  Results.  For our study area in 2002, the lfri regressions show strong direct associations among high 
foreclosure sale rates and three categories of variables—credit risk variables, minority homeownership 
transition variables, and demographic factors, chiefly age.  When measured by actual credit score 
information, the credit risk variable provides the strongest ability of any single variable we tested to 
account for the neighborhood pattern of foreclosure sales.  The combination of this credit risk variable 
and a measure of the change in minority homeownership share from 1990–2000 is nearly as effective in 
explaining the pattern as all other sets of variables we tried.  However, other variables can modestly 
improve the fit of our regressions or are significant in our minimum Chi-squared estimates.  Some of the 
other variables seem to augment the model’s credit risk information.  They improve the overall fit and 
somewhat diminish the coefficient on the credit risk variable.  Other variables, such as those pertaining to 
age, may add a new dimension to the model, beyond credit risk and minority transition. 
 
We also find that the year 2000 level of (as opposed to the 1990–2000 change in) the share of minorities 
(in the population or among homeowners) is highly correlated with credit risk variables.  This creates a 
strong indirect association between foreclosure sale rates and static minority share variables that is of 
independent interest.   Static minority share variables can also appear to have a direct relationship to 
foreclosure rates if high-quality measures of credit risk are omitted from the analysis. 
 
Table 6 summarizes our multivariate results.  Model 1 attempts to explain the neighborhood pattern of 
foreclosure sale rates using only the variable VHCREDIT2, the percentage of neighborhood adults whose 
credit score is in the very risky (i.e., very low) category.  Based on the percentage of variance explained 
in OLS regressions that include a constant and one explanatory variable at a time, we find that this 
variable has the strongest individual relationship with the neighborhood pattern of foreclosures.   
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Models 2 and 3 add two measures of racial/ethnic characteristics.
22  OPCT_NW00 equals the share of 
minority homeowners in the neighborhood in 2000.  Specifically, it equals 
      [(minority homeowners in 2000)/(all homeowners in 2000)], 
where “minority” is defined as any household head not coded as a non-Hispanic White person only.  For 
example, minority in 2000 includes multirace individuals.  OPCT_NW90 is the analogous variable for 
1990, and CHG_NWOWNPCT equals OPCT_NW00 - OPCT_NW90.  Thus, OPCT_NW00 is a static 
variable, measuring the share of minority homeowners at a point in time (2000), whereas 
CHG_NWOWNPCT is a dynamic, or neighborhood transition, variable, measuring the change in 
minority homeownership share during the 1990s.  Both variables reflect aspects of the neighborhoods’ 
racial and ethnic characteristics, and yet they are not redundant.  Their bivariate correlation is not strong, 
0.39, and their relationship to the neighborhood foreclosure pattern is also different, as shown in the 
Model 3 results for lfri, where the dynamic variable is highly significant while the static variable is 
insignificant.  We explore this fact further below, where we note that the static measure of minority share 
is highly correlated with VHCREDIT2.  We regard VHCREDIT2 as a relatively precise indicator of share 
of the high-credit-risk population in the neighborhood.  As long as it is present, static measures of 
minority presence in the neighborhood add little to the fit of our models.
23  
 
By contrast, CHG_NWOWNPCT is very important to the fit of our model, as indicated by a comparison 
of Model 2 and Model 1.  With VHCREDIT2 already present, no other variable we tried has so large an 
impact on the standard error of estimate, the log likelihood, or the R-bar-squared as this measure of 
increased minority homeownership.  Adding further variables, as in Models 4 and 5, improves the fit of 
the model, but not to the same extent as adding CHG_NWOWNPCT to Model 1.  In that sense, Model 2 
                                                           
22 We have also computed similar regressions with variables analogous to OPCT_NW00 and CHG_NWOWNPCT but specific to 
African Americans, Asian-Hawaiian-Pacific Islanders, and Hispanics.  In all cases examined, F-tests come nowhere near 
rejecting the hypothesis that the coefficients of the race and ethnicity variables are identical.  (The similarity of Asian and other 
minorities here is likely linked to the large share of relatively low-income Southeast Asian former-refugee families in the Twin 
Cities in 2000 and might not hold elsewhere). 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Community Affairs Report 2006-1  Page 22  
provides a relatively good, two-dimensional account of the neighborhood pattern of foreclosures in 
Hennepin and Ramsey Counties in 2002.  The two key dimensions appear to be credit risk and change in 
the racial and ethnic homeownership shares.  We defer our discussion of how to interpret these two 
dimensions. 
 
We could perhaps conclude our multivariate analysis with Model 2, as it is simple and fits nearly as well 
as any model we found.  In fact we did extensive robustness checking of Model 2 by testing whether 
additional variables could greatly improve the fit or overturn the significance of its two key variables.  
Because many variables in our dataset are highly correlated, adding more variables to the model tends to 
reduce the significance of any individual variable, including our two key variables.  However, both key 
variables remained significant in almost all specifications.  We present Models 4 and 5 as examples of the 
best-fitting and most informative alternative models. 
 
In keeping with the options theory of foreclosures, Model 4 adds a variable that measures the presence of 
high loan-to-value mortgages in the neighborhood.  FHA99PMORT is the number of FHA home 
purchase mortgages originated in 1999 divided by the number of mortgaged units in 2000.  Since FHA 
mortgages are disproportionately used by borrowers who have difficulty qualifying for conventional 
credit and often feature low down payments, they are relatively at risk for foreclosure.  This variable 
provides more neighborhood detail on the extent of risky mortgage lending and possible ruthless 
foreclosures, beyond the basic credit risk information in VHCREDIT2.  It slightly improves the model’s 
fit, as shown in Table 6.  The new variable also partly substitutes for VHCREDIT2, as shown by the large 
drop in the coefficient on VHCREDIT2 between Model 3 and Model 4.  This is not surprising since 
FHA99PMORT has a bivariate correlation of 0.59 with VHCREDIT2.  It reinforces and adds extra detail 
to the model’s credit risk dimension, without adding a truly new dimension to the model.
24 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
23 In results not shown, we have verified this for other static measures of race and ethnicity, including population share.   
24 We also tried a credit risk variable based on the prevalence of subprime refinancing, but it was not significant. 
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According to Model 5, three other credit risk indicators are also significantly related to foreclosure sale 
rates but mainly substitute for already included variables in their effects on model fit.  Young 
homeowners, measured in OWN45P as the percent of homeowners under 45, tend to be at higher risk of 
foreclosure for a number of reasons—low income, low personal wealth, and higher risk of 
unemployment, and relatively new mortgages with little equity to protect or draw on.  VACANT00 
reflects the percent of area housing units listed as vacant in Census 2000.  LOAN2INC is the ratio 
average loan amount to median borrower income for the tract, both from HMDA data for 2000. 
VACANT00 is a broad indicator of trigger event prevalence, and LOAN2INC reflects financial 
vulnerability. 
 
Adding OWN45P helps clarify that the effects of the key minority transition variable, 
CHG_NWOWNPCT, are not merely due to age effects.  The minority population in the Twin Cities is 
relatively young by national standards, due to substantial domestic and foreign in-migration of young 
adults.  It is conceivable, therefore, that our minority transition variable mostly reflects age, not race or 
ethnicity.  The addition of OWN45P suggests that this is not the case.  OWN45P does take away some of 
the explanatory power of CHG_NWOWNPCT, as seen in its lowered coefficient in Model 5.  However, 
CHG_NWOWNPCT remains highly significant, even controlling for age effects.  In the absence of 
OWN45P, the importance of CHG_NWOWNPCT may be slightly exaggerated, due to its ability to 
capture some age effects.  However, CHG_NWOWNPCT’s primary role in the model is as a measure of 
racial and ethnic transition into homeownership.  In that role, it has few substitutes.  When we drop 
variables one at a time from Model 5 (or models with additional variables added to explain lfri), the 
dropping of CHG_NWOWNPCT causes the largest decline in model fit.  In results not shown, we find 
that OWN45P and VACANT00 are mainly responsible for the reduction in the coefficient on 
VHCREDIT2 between Model 4 and Model 5, while LOAN2INC mainly reduces the coefficient on 
FHA99PMORT. 
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Overall, our regressions suggest a strong role for credit risk, which can be measured by several only 
slightly independent variables, as well as a possibly independent role for minority homeownership 
transition.  Applying factor analysis to an expanded set of variables yields somewhat similar results.  One 
common factor is dominant (eigenvalue 10.8) and has strong positive weights on credit risk variables like 
VHCREDIT2, strong negative weights on financial stability variables like education level, and a 
moderately high weight on CHG_NWOWNPCT.  Two additional factors may be marginally important 
(eigenvalues 1.13 and 0.72); these factors place relatively high weights on the new variables in Models 4 
and 5 and a measure of housing appreciation 1990-2000.
25  However, those variables and 




D.  The key role of accurate credit risk data.  Although information on credit histories and credit scores 
has been widely recognized as relevant to foreclosure risks, data on the neighborhood distribution of 
credit scores often has not been available to public officials, foreclosure counselors, or foreclosure 
researchers.  As a result, researchers and others have constructed proxies for credit risk from more widely 
available data.  One proxy that has been used recently is the rate of denial on prime home-purchase 
mortgage applications.
27  This rate can be computed annually at the census tract level from data publicly 
available under HMDA. 
 
                                                           
25 The housing appreciation variable was not significant in our regressions, however. Other variables suggested by foreclosure 
theory that we found to be insignificant when added to our models include the percentage of individuals who lack a credit score, 
the percentages of household heads with a high school or college education, the tract unemployment rate, the percentage of 
renter, the prevalence of subprime refinancing, and mean tract income. 
26 Principal components gave broadly similar results. 
27 Regarding the quality of credit risk measures, in our data the use of denial rates on prime mortgage applications as a proxy for 
credit score information would suggest a strong direct relationship between minority shares and foreclosure sale rates, even 
though this relationship disappears (for lfri) when credit score information is included.  Denial rate proxies have been used as 
credit risk proxies in recent foreclosure studies when credit score information was not available.  Our result raises the possibility 
that other studies might have found a direct association between foreclosure sale rates and minority population (or 
homeownership) shares when only a more indirect relationship might have appeared if actual credit score measures had been 
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We have computed a version of the HMDA denial proxy for our neighborhoods.  However, when we 
substitute it for VHCREDIT2, a measure of risk based on actual credit scores, our findings change 
significantly.  In particular, static race/ethnicity variables—variables representing the level of minority 
presence in the neighborhood—become significantly associated with the neighborhood pattern of 
foreclosures, even in the presence of our other control variables (including change in minority 
homeownership).  This is true whether minority presence is measured as share of homeowners (the most 
clearly relevant group for foreclosure risks) or as share of population. 
 
Further analysis suggests the change may result because the HMDA denial proxy underestimates credit-
score-based measures of credit risk in minority neighborhoods.  The simple correlation between the 
HMDA proxy and VHCREDIT2, our credit-score-based measure of credit risk, is quite strong, 0.84, and 
regressing VHCREDIT2 on the HMDA proxy explains 70 percent of the variance of VHCREDIT2.  This 
clearly suggests that the HMDA proxy can be useful in identifying neighborhoods with high foreclosure 
risks when actual credit score data are not available.  However, the Year 2000 minority shares of 
population and of homeowners are also strongly correlated with credit risk in our sample, with correlation 
coefficients of 0.91 and 0.83, respectively.  When either of these variables is added to the regression of 
VHCREDIT2 on the HMDA proxy, the minority presence variables have positive, highly significant 
coefficients, and the amount of the VHCREDIT2 variance explained rises noticeably (to 76 percent with 
minority share of homeownership and 83 percent with minority share of population).  Our findings 
suggest that for research or analytical purposes, the HMDA denial rate proxy may be an imperfect 
substitute for accurate credit score data. We find that its use may exaggerate the direct linkages between 
neighborhood racial/ethnic composition and foreclosure risks. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
available.  See Apgar, Calder, and Fauth (2004); Apgar and Duda (2005a); Apgar and Duda (2005b); and Galster, Hayes, and 
Johnson (2005).  Additional research, preferably involving other cities, would be necessary to evaluate this possibility. 
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E.  Implications for program design and causality.  We do not expect that our data can pin down a single 
causal explanation for the pattern of foreclosure sale rates observed in Hennepin and Ramsey counties in 
2002.  However, we think our multivariate results can help guide some of the responses to foreclosures 
and may challenge some of the existing causal models. 
 
Our finding that rising minority homeownership seemed to have a strong association with foreclosure sale 
rates, independent of credit scores and other factors, may have implications for programs that seek to 
boost minority homeownership rates.  Whatever the cause of this association, homeownership 
preservation or foreclosure mitigation programs in areas with rising minority homeownership rates may 
find it useful to conduct targeted outreach to new minority homeowners, to ensure that they are aware of 
the program’s services and will feel comfortable accessing them if they are needed.  This conclusion is 
reinforced by other evidence that minority households have a significantly higher rate of exit from 
homeownership than white households.
28 
 
Our data, although extensive, are basically a single cross-section.  Furthermore, although we also 
collected a limited sample of data on nonforeclosed mortgages in a portion of Minneapolis (detailed 
above), we have little information about the broader population of mortgages from which the 2002 
foreclosures emerged.  For these reasons, the possibilities for using our data to identify the fundamental 
underlying causes of foreclosures are limited.  Our results may support the causal model of Baxter and 
Lauria (2000) and Lauria (1998) that foreclosures cause neighborhood racial transition.  Lauria (1998) 
provides the following summary of the causal linkage: “Middle-income professional whites employed in 
businesses impacted by recession who had recently bought housing with high loan-to-value ratios were 
forced to sell or have their houses foreclosed upon.  The depressed market, in turn, made such housing 
affordable to middle-class blacks interested in homeownership.”
29   
                                                           
28 Grover and Todd (2005); Haurin and Rosenthal (2004); and Reid (2004). 
29 Lauria (1998, p. 9). 
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Although the Baxter and Lauria model has been cited as potentially relevant to foreclosure dynamics in 
other economically distressed cities,
30 we are not ready to judge it the best interpretation of our findings.  
Some of our facts match their interpretation, such as the association between racial transition and 
foreclosure sales, and we also measure foreclosures in the wake of a recession and during a period of 
elevated unemployment.  However, unlike in Baxter and Lauria’s study, our 1990–2000 measure of racial 
transition predates the year of our foreclosures, 2002.  This raises at least some doubts about whether 
foreclosures were the cause of the increase in minority homeownership that was common in our high 
foreclosure neighborhoods, although we would need data on foreclosures in earlier years to more fully 
address this point.   
 
As a competing hypothesis, we suggest a simpler possibility.
31   Expanded credit access and a strong 
economy allowed many economically vulnerable minority households to become homeowners in the 
Twin Cities in the late 1990s.  When the economy turned down in 2000, many of these new minority 
homeowners experienced income declines and had too little home equity or other household wealth to 
maintain their mortgage payments.  This timeline is also bolstered by the median age of foreclosed 
mortgages (2.6 years) in our analysis.  With Ameriquest and its affiliates being by far the most common 
lenders among our foreclosures and in light of their recent agreement to settle (without admission of 
wrongdoing) claims of abusive lending within our study area, we also note the potential role of subprime 
and possibly abusive refinancing aimed at inexperienced minority homebuyers experiencing financial 
distress.  Under either our simple or augmented hypothesis, increased minority homeownership is a signal 
of vulnerability to foreclosure, due in part to the low wealth-to-income ratios that are still common among 
minority households.  Furthermore, it is a signal to enhance homeownership preservation and foreclosure 
mitigation programs in neighborhoods with increasing minority homeownership.   
                                                           
30 For example, see Garcia (2003). 
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VII.  Recommendations for Better Data on Foreclosures and Related Factors 
 
We gained access to sufficient data for the purpose of analyzing the spatial distribution of foreclosures in 
Hennepin and Ramsey counties.  Through the complications we experienced along the way, which are 
detailed in the first section of the paper, we also gained insights into how foreclosure data can be made 
more accessible and useful.  Based on those insights, we have developed the following recommendations.  
While we suggest serious consideration of these recommendations and believe their implementation could 
make local foreclosure prevention efforts more efficient and effective, we recognize that no analysis of 
the public- and private-sector cost of implementing these proposals has been completed.  Furthermore, 
some of these proposals may require changes to policy and/or practice at several political or 
organizational levels, depending how local, county and state laws work together.   
 
Consider making more data available in an electronic format.  Although private firms collect foreclosure 
information to sell to investors and others with a business interest in foreclosed properties, most 
government agencies and nonprofit foreclosure mitigation practitioners have no convenient access to 
these data, and there has been little effort to make foreclosure records readily available to the public.  
During the early part of our research, we spent considerable time entering information from paper 
foreclosure-sale documents into an electronic spreadsheet that was linked to GIS and statistical software 
programs.  In order to speed up this process, we recommend an assessment of whether to make 
foreclosure filing and sale information available in an electronic format on a periodic basis, preferably on 
an easily accessible Web page.  The results in this paper suggest that there would be benefits.  These need 
to be quantified and compared to the costs.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
31 A version of this hypothesis also seems to be among the several hypotheses that Lauria and Baxter (2000) discuss, but it is not 
the one that seems to make their model appealing to other foreclosure analysts. 
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Consider updating or adding key information to foreclosure notices and sales documents to make them 
complete.  Addresses are not the only useful pieces of information in the foreclosure filings and sales 
documents.  The growing number of transactions contracted through mortgage intermediaries, such as 
MERS, increases the need for accurate information about the lenders involved.  We recommend that 
consideration be given to having foreclosure filing and sale records provide more comprehensive, up-to-
date data to the public, including updated information on the originating lender or the type of loan.  Other 
data, such as information on interest rates and riders, would also be valuable to foreclosure mitigation 
efforts.  Much of this information already exists at the county property-records departments and could be 
linked to foreclosure documents using the legal description or tax identification number of the property.   
 
Consider maintaining a database repository of foreclosure notices and sales that contains historical and 
current records.  At present, only sporadic research and data collection efforts on foreclosure patterns 
take place in most metropolitan areas.  Therefore, we recommend the creation of a foreclosure database 
that would collect and maintain the information, both historic and current, that is included on the public 
filing and sale documents, augmented by additional information from the mortgage documents found at 
county property-records departments. Access to the database would be granted to public and nonprofit 
groups, especially those groups engaged in foreclosure prevention activities.  One possible location for 
this database could be through the counties themselves, since they already maintain property-record files 
and, by law, collect foreclosure information. 
 
Consider making neighborhood credit-score-based measures available to foreclosure mitigation efforts.  
Lastly, our final proposal relates to the key finding in our multivariate analysis, namely that the credit-
score-based measure of credit risk was the factor most strongly and robustly associated with the 
geographic concentrations of foreclosures.  As noted previously, the neighborhood distribution of credit 
scores is not readily available or free of cost to public officials, foreclosure counselors, or foreclosure 
researchers.  Updated credit score data for the population are available, but only at a cost through vendors.  
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Because this information has an important public use, we therefore recommend that the provision and 
public availability of these data at the census tract level on an annual basis be investigated.           
 
VIII.  Concluding Remarks 
 
As public policy continues to promote homeownership, especially as it relates to closing racial and ethnic 
homeownership gaps, foreclosure mitigation efforts will be crucial to preserving the gains made through 
these efforts.  In order to monitor foreclosure trends and deliver effective services, these efforts need 
access to accurate, timely and inexpensive data on foreclosures and mortgages as well as to variables that 
can help them predict where foreclosures will concentrate and understand what factors are most closely 
related to foreclosures.    
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Table 1: Foreclosure Sales Characteristics by Political Subdivisions 
County Number  Percent 




Hennepin 831 70.5% 3.95 210,533
Ramsey 347 29.5% 4.12 84,202
Total 1,178 100.0% 4.00 294,735
      
Central Cities       
      
Minneapolis 414 35.1% 7.61 54,379
St. Paul  298 25.3% 7.36 40,494
All Other Cities  466 39.6% 2.33 199,862
Total 1,178 100.0% 4.00 294,735
 
 




Non Foreclosed Purchased 
Properties (N=198)
Mean interest rate*  10.1 % 7.9%
Mean mortgage principle*  $71,675 $95,492
Percent nonbank lender**  77.8 % 62.2%
Percent subprime lender*  47% 11%
Percent holding other mortgage*  35% 8%
 
* Significant at .001 level. 
** Significant at .01 level. 
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Table 3:  Correlations Between 2002 Neighborhood Foreclosure Rates and Other Neighborhood 
Characteristics (Hennepin and Ramsey Counties) 
Neighborhood Characteristic  Correlation 
Credit risk variables   
   1999 share of households with very risky (very low) credit scores   .76 
   1996–99 rate of denial on prime home purchase mortgage applications (HMDA)   .69 
   1999 subprime refinancing originations per Census 2000 mortgaged unit   .69 
   1999 FHA originations per Census 2000 mortgaged units   .46 
   
Race and ethnicity variables   
   2000 minority* share of population   .77 
   2000 minority share of homeowners   .73 
   1990–2000 change in minority share of population   .50 
   1990–2000 change in minority share of homeowners   .67 
   
Other   
   2000 percent of population over 25 with a college degree  -.56 
   2000 percent of population over 18 with a high school diploma or equivalent  -.73 
   Logarithm of 1999 average household income  -.54 
   2000 rate of unemployment   .64 
   2000 percent of home-owning households with head younger than 45 years old   .30 
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Table 4: Comparing 7 Variables’ Ability to Identify Tracts with Highest 2002 Foreclosure Sale Rates* 
  Highest 20  Highest 50  Highest Quintile (65) 
  # correct  % correct  # correct   % correct  # correct  % correct 
Risky Credit Scores in 1999  9  45  36  72  50  77 
Percent Poor in 1990  9  55  34  70  44 (.071)  68 
Percent Nonwhite in 1990  9  45  34  68  43 (.034)  66 
Percent Nonwhite Owners in 1990  8  40  29 (.039)  58  36 (.000)  55 
Low Income in 1990  9  45  35  70  43 (.001)  66 
High Subprime Refi in 1999  9  45  35  70  43 (.033)  66 
High Prime Denial Rate 1996-99  8  40  32  64  40 (.004)  62 
 
*Figures in parentheses are p values for the null that the variable is equivalent to the credit score variable in its 
ability to correctly identify top 50 or top quintile tracts, based on 1,000 random rank swaps.  Values not shown 
are greater than 0.10. 
 
 










Occurrence of equal or 
larger differences in 
1,000 random ranks 
swaps 
Risky Credit Scores in 1999  .640  NA  NA 
Percent Poor in 1990  .511  .129  0 
Percent Nonwhite in 1990  .480  .160  0 
Percent Nonwhite Owners in 1990  .387  .253  0 
Low Income in 1990  .564  .076  2 
High Subprime Refi in 1999  .559  .081  14 
High Prime Denial Rate 1996-99  .571  .069  2 
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Table 6: Multivariate Regression Results
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Panel A: Dependent Variable lfri; Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
CONSTANT -7.78*** -7.62*** -7.57*** -7.55***  -8.84*** 
VHCREDIT2 11.41*** 8.87*** 8.40*** 6.86***    5.98*** 
CHG NWOWNPCT   4.52*** 4.44*** 3.95***    4.02*** 
OPCT NW00   0.34 0.86   0.95 
FHA99PMORT   7.61   6.58** 
OWN45P     0.42 
VACANT00     19.92* 
LOAN2INC     0.49** 
Std. error of est.   1.176  1.152 1.153 1.151  1.152 
Log likelihood  -516.09 -508.71 -508.63 -507.53 -507.17 
R-bar squared   0.347  0.373 0.372 0.374  0.373 
Panel B: Dependent Variable lfri; Minimum Chi-Square Estimation
CONSTANT -7.51*** -7.32*** -7.36*** -7.38***  -8.94*** 
VHCREDIT2 10.79*** 8.28*** 8.68*** 6.88***    5.79*** 
CHG NWOWNPCT   3.58*** 3.60*** 3.21***    2.98*** 
OPCT NW00   -0.22 0.42   0.64 
FHA99PMORT   9.81***   8.24** 
OWN45P     1.38*** 
VACANT00     12.93***
LOAN2INC     0.46*** 
*, **, or ***:  Significant at 0.10, 0.05, or 0.01 level, respectively.
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N = 728 Foreclosure sales
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N = 1,173 Foreclosure salesFigure 5: Distribution of Interest Rate Percentage Point Differences (Actual - Prevailing) 













































72% N = 1,175 Foreclosure salesFigure 7: 2002 Foreclosure Sales by Merged Tract Non-White 










































































N = 327 Merged Census Tracts


















































N = 327 Merged Census Tracts
   